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passage of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, which led to the end of welfare 
as we knew it.  Effective July 1, 1997, 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), the primary cash assistance 
program for the poor since the mid 1930s, 
was replaced with the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program, 
or TANF. 
As a result, the EITC today is almost 
unrecognizable from its former modest 
self.  It is now the largest cash transfer 
program for the poor and the near-poor, 
distributing a total of approximately $30 
billion to more than 18 million families.  
In contrast, in 2002, TANF served an 
average of 2.1 million families, providing 
them approximately $12.5 billion.   As 
seen in Figure 2, since 1990, the average 
credit doubled in real terms, and the 
number of households receiving a credit 
rose more than 50 percent.
The enormous expansion of the EITC 
has prompted a large increase in research 
about the EITC and its impact on the 
economy, as well as some controversy 
and criticism.  In light of that, we set out 
to update our 1990 book.  Our new book, 
Helping Working Families: The Earned 
In 1990, the Upjohn Institute 
published our book, The Earned  Income 
Tax Credit: Anti-Poverty Effectiveness 
and Labor Market Effects, a slim 91-page 
monograph that surveyed quite 
thoroughly almost everything known at 
the time about the economic impact of the 
earned  income tax credit (EITC). The 
EITC, which was introduced in 1975 as a 
small work bonus for very low-income 
working families, was then still a little 
known and lightly funded government 
program that played a minor role in the 
government’s set of antipoverty policies.  
Despite the cutbacks of the Reagan era, 
traditional welfare still thoroughly 
dominated antipoverty policy. 
Yet even then, the EITC was clearly 
something different.  Alone among 
income transfer programs for the poor, the 
EITC conditioned its benefits on 
earnings.  Families without earnings 
received nothing, and benefits actually 
increased with family earnings through a 
portion of the income distribution before 
eventually phasing out at higher incomes. 
This was just the opposite of traditional 
welfare programs, which provided 
maximum benefits to households with no 
earnings. The unique benefit structure of 
the EITC for 2001 is shown in Figure 1; 
households with one child receive slightly 
lower benefits, and childless households 
receive a very small maximum credit.
Married couples as well as single 
parents were eligible for EITC under 
identical rules, which was another 
difference from traditional welfare.  
Technically, the EITC was not even a 
welfare program—it was a tax credit 
administered by the IRS.   And unlike 
most other tax credits, it was refundable, 
which meant that poor working families 
could fully realize its benefits, even if 
they owed little or no taxes.
For these reasons, the EITC was 
emerging as a government antipoverty 
program that both liberals and 
conservatives could support.  It was fast 
becoming, as we wrote then in our 
introduction, “a rallying point in 
redirecting poverty policy.”  We noted 
that its “time in the national agenda has 
clearly come,” and we predicted that it 
would grow.  
If only we could be so accurate with all 
our predictions!  Today, it is almost 
impossible to imagine U.S. income 
transfer policy without the EITC.  Two 
major policy actions were decisive in this 
transformation.  The first was the 
expansion of the EITC program itself in 
1991, and again and more substantially in 
1993.   The second change resulted in the 
Saul D. Hoffman and Laurence S. Seidman
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Figure 1 EITC Benefits, by Household Income, for Families with Two or More 
Children, 2001
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tax and the payroll tax, yields a 
marginal tax rate of nearly 50 
percent.  There is growing evidence 
that this high tax rate has discouraged 
work in married-couple families with 
moderate incomes. 
• The EITC imposes substantial 
financial penalties on many married 
couples.  If a childless full-time 
minimum wage worker marries a 
full-time minimum wage worker 
with two children, they suffer an 
EITC marriage penalty of more than 
$1,600 compared to what they could 
have if they remained single.  If they 
each have two children, their EITC 
financial sacrifice to marry would be 
$5,600!  
• The EITC still leaves larger families 
with low-wage workers in poverty.  
A married couple with two children 
and a single wage earner working full 
time at $6.50 an hour are still poor 
even after adding in the $4,000 EITC 
income they would get.  Larger 
families remain even further below 
the poverty line. 
Fortunately, these problems are not 
independent.  Solving one problem 
contributes to solving the others.  The 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 
2001 has already provided some EITC 
marriage penalty relief by increasing the 
Income Tax Credit, which was just 
published by the Upjohn Institute (see
 p. 7 for details), is the result of our 
efforts.  It now weighs in at a respectable 
245 pages, befitting the increased 
importance of the program. 
Our own position, reinforced by the 
many research studies we have reviewed, 
is that the EITC is a government program 
which, on the whole, works well.  That 
alone is no small achievement in the 
policy world of antipoverty programs, 
many of which have a well-documented 
history of failure and/or unanticipated 
negative effects.  The EITC continues to 
offer substantial and meaningful earnings 
supplements to low- and moderate-
income households.  It successfully 
pushes many working families out of 
poverty, and it is a viable and attractive 
alternative to an increase in the minimum 
wage.
  However, some problems have 
emerged:  
• Like any income support program, 
EITC benefits eventually decrease as 
a family’s income increases.  As 
shown in Figure 1, this occurs at a 
household income between about 
$13,000 and $32,000.  For families 
with two or more children, the phase-
out rate is 21 percent, which, when 
combined with the federal income 
beginning point of the EITC phase-out 
range for married couples by $3,000 over 
the next five years. We propose a further 
reduction in the EITC marriage penalty, 
implemented in a different way.   In 
addition, we would make two more 
changes: 
• Reduce the current EITC phase-out 
rate for a family with two or more 
children from 21.06 percent to 15.98 
percent, which is the current phase-
out rate for a family with one child.  
This will improve work incentives 
for families on the phase-out range, 
reduce the marriage penalty, and help 
lift larger families above the poverty 
line by allowing them to retain a 
greater proportion of their EITC 
grant while they are still below the 
poverty income level.
• Provide a new, more generous rate 
schedule for families with three or 
more children by increasing the 
phase-in rate from its current value of 
40 percent to 42 percent, and 
increasing the income on which that 
credit is earned by about $1,000. This 
would increase the maximum EITC 
grant for these families by $600 if 
they are single parents, and by 
$1,500 if they are married. This too 
reduces the marriage penalty of the 
EITC, and it also helps lift larger 
families above the poverty line.
In our most recent book, we examine 
the likely impact of this reform using 
representative national data on 
households.  Our proposed reform would 
increase the number of families 
qualifying for the EITC by about 20 
percent and increase program costs by 
about $13 billion, which really is not an 
enormous amount.  Of all the new 
spending in our reform, almost half will 
go to working families with an income 
that leaves them less than 50 percent 
above the poverty line, and only about 
one-sixth will go to families with incomes 
of at least twice the poverty line.  Ninety 
percent of all new spending goes to 
families with two or more children. 
Nothing we can foresee suggests that 
transfer policy or labor markets will 
change in ways that will make the EITC 
Figure 2 EITC Receipt and Average EITC Benefits Per Recipient Household, 
1990–2000
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that include substantial increases in 
federal spending targeted on child care. 
Given the severe financial constraints 
facing single-mother families, it may be 
that the current approach to welfare-to-
work is ill-advised, given its emphasis on 
work first without sufficient child care 
support. Although child care spending has 
increased, single mothers still report being 
unable to find and pay for quality care.
ER: What about family leave policies? 
Are there public policy issues involved 
with these? 
JK: The federal government entered 
into the family leave policy arena due to a 
concern about economic security for 
families. With the passage of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993, 
most workers are guaranteed 12 weeks of 
unpaid leave to care for an ill family 
member or for personal illness. Examining 
seven years of data concerning access and 
take-up of this leave, Dr. Katherin Ross 
Phillips of the Urban Institute found that 
the majority of such leaves are taken for 
personal illness, thereby debunking the 
myth that FMLA is women’s policy rather 
than family policy. Additionally, as Dr. 
Phillips explains, because FMLA-granted 
leave is unpaid, workers who might need 
the leave most are unable to take 
advantage of it due to financial constraints. 
She offers a list of specific policy 
proposals that would help to alleviate the 
financial burden faced by families with a 
worker taking leave from work. 
ER: Who is the audience for this 
book?
JK: Each chapter in this book is 
written in a straightforward, nontechnical 
manner, so the book is intended for a 
broad audience, including scholars as 
well as the general public. In addition, 
Emily and I believe the book would be an 
excellent supplemental text for numerous 
college courses, including Women and the 
Economy, The Economics of the Family, 
and Labor Economics courses. In fact, I 
am using the book as a supplemental 
reader in my Women and the Economy 
course this semester, and I think the 
students will find it useful because of its 
content and will appreciate the relatively 
low price!
ER: Thank you. We wish you success 
with this book.
less important.  In the 2000s, many 
women with few labor market skills will 
undoubtedly enter the labor market, most 
likely in a less robust economy than was 
seen in the 1990s.  Also here to stay, it 
appears, is the poorer labor market 
position of less-skilled, less-educated 
workers.  Most economists believe that 
these labor market changes reflect 
underlying changes in labor demand 
driven by changes in technology, 
especially computerization.  That trend is 
unlikely to change in ways that would 
benefit less-skilled workers.  
Globalization of the economy is another 
contributing factor, and that too is 
unlikely to be reversed.  Policies to 
promote human capital investment will be 
important, but there certainly will remain 
workers whose skills leave them without 
the ability to earn middle-class incomes. 
We believe that continued generous 
assistance to these workers is fully 
appropriate.  It is very much in the 
American tradition of helping the 
“deserving poor,” here understood to 
include families above the poverty line 
but well below middle class.  And in that 
effort, the EITC will remain the policy 
instrument of choice for the foreseeable 
future.
Saul D. Hoffman and Laurence S. 
Seidman both teach economics at the 
University of Delaware. 
New Book Addresses 
Challenges of Balancing 
Work and Family
The Upjohn Institute has just published 
The Economics of Work and Family, which 
contains proceedings from the 2000–2001 
Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series. 
Employment Research recently sat down with 
one of the editors, Jean Kimmel, to talk about 
the book. Kimmel is an associate professor of 
economics at Western Michigan University, 
which, along with the Upjohn Institute, is a 
cosponsor of the annual lecture-seminar 
series. 
Employment Research (ER): Thank 
you very much, Professor Kimmel, for 
taking the time to provide our readers 
with some information about your new 
book, coedited with Professor Emily 
Hoffman. First, could you tell us why you 
organized the seminars around this 
particular set of issues?
Jean Kimmel (JK): As labor 
economists, Emily and I are aware of 
growing concerns regarding workers’ 
efforts to balance work and family, and 
the related research and policy agendas. 
While work/family balance has always 
been a concern for labor economists, with 
the dramatic recent increases in the 
employment of women—particularly 
mothers of young children—the topic is 
gaining increased interest. It is a timely 
topic, and we felt the book would be of 
interest to a broad audience.
ER: How would you characterize the 
bottom line of your seminar presenters 
about the issues such as child care? Is 
there a role for public policy?
JK: The only bottom line on which the 
two child care chapter authors agree 
relates to the problems of inadequate 
quality and affordability. They propose to 
solve the problems in very different ways. 
Professor David Blau outlines a two-
pronged approach in which quality is 
addressed through incentives for providers 
to acquire accreditation, and affordability 
is addressed through income-based child 
credits that are not given conditional on 
employment or even the use of paid child 
care. Professor Barbara Bergmann focuses 
on the affordability problem, particularly 
for single mothers, and proposes solutions 
